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The aim of this paper is to propose an account of scopal phenom-
ena involving Japanese evidentials in terms of Update Semantics. Evi-
dentials are linguistic devices that mark the source of information on
which an utterance is based (Aikhenvald (2004)). Although Japanese
has a variety of evidential items, we will focus on two of them: the indi-
rect yoo and the reportative soo. This is because the literature about
these two items is relatively rich compared to other Japanese eviden-
tials.1Their typical use is as follows:
(1) Ame-ga futteiru-yoo/soo-da.
rain-Nom falling-yoo/soo-Cop.
‘[It seems/I hear] that it is raining.’
φ+yoo indicates that the speaker acquires or infers φ through indirect
evidence, and φ+soo signals that φ has been told to the speaker by
someone else.
This paper concerns the scopal behavior of Japanese evidentials.
First, Japanese evidentials obligatorily take wider scope over negation.
(2) a. Ame-ga futtei-nai-yoo/soo-da.
rain-Nom falling-Neg-yoo/soo-Cop.
‘[It seems/I hear] that it is not raining.’
b. # Ame-ga futteiru-yoo/soo-de-nai.
rain-Nom falling-yoo/soo-Cop-Neg.
1
‘(Intended) [It doesn’t seem/I don’t hear] that it is raining.’
The negative marker -nai in (2 b) is intended to negate the contribu-
tion of the evidentials, but the sentence sounds terribly awkward,
while (2 a), where -nai stays within the scope of evidentials, is totally
acceptable. A similar pattern is observed for epistemic modals:
(3) a. Ame-ga futteiru-kamoshirenai/nichigainai-yoo/soo-da.
rain-Nom falling-might/must-yoo/soo-Cop.
‘[It seems/I hear] that it might/must be raining.’
b. # Ame-ga futteiru-yoo/soo-dearu-kamoshirenai/nichigainai.
rain-Nom falling-yoo/soo-Cop-might/must
‘(Intended) [It might/must seem / I might/must hear] that it
is raining.’
As with negation, the epistemic modals kamoshirenai ‘might’ and
nichigainai ‘must’ cannot scope over evidentials. This paper deals with
why such contrasts arise. To the best of my knowledge, there are no
studies that attempt to elucidate the answer to this question.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 intro-
duces the ingredients of my framework, which is based on Veltman
(1996) and McCready (2015). Section 3 shows how my proposal works
in explaining the preceding data. Section 4 is the conclusion.
2. The Framework of Update Semantics
In this section, I construct my own framework. In the course of
discussion, first I introduce the basic framework of Update Semantics
and the more complicated one proposed by McCready (2015). After
that I integrate the two systems and build my own system that can
explain the data at issue.
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2.1. The Basic Notions
In Update Semantics, it is assumed that what an agent (in other
words, a participant in the conversation) knows (or believes) is repre-
sented as the information state of the agent, which is defined to be a
set of possible worlds where all propositions that she knows (or be-
lieves) are true. I further assume that the information state of an agent
represents her knowledge in the discourse, that is, what she is known
to know. Thus, the context of conversation contains each participant’s
information state. When the speaker utters it is raining, other partici-
pants learn that she knows (or at least believes) the truth of that
proposition, and her information state σ is updated by it in the follow-
ing way ( σ [φ] stands for ‘σ updated by φ’, and now φ is it is raining):
(4) σ [φ] = σ∩〚φ〛
That is, due to the update, only worlds where φ is true (henceforth, φ-
worlds) are left in σ, and ¬φ-worlds are eliminated from it. If the up-
dated state is the empty set, it is regarded as a contradiction and the
discourse crashes.
Following Veltman (1996), I adopt particular forms of update for
negation and a possibility modal (might in English, kamoshirenai in
Japanese)2.
(5) a. Negation
σ [¬φ] = σ - σ [φ]
b. Possibility modal
σ [♢φ] = σ if σ [φ] ≠∅
∅ if σ [φ] = ∅
As in (5 a), a negated proposition ¬φ updates σ in two steps; first, φ up-
dates σ according to (4), leaving only φ-worlds in the resulting state,
and second, the resulting state is subtracted from the original state σ.
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This process is equivalent to eliminating φ-worlds from σ. (5 b) is the
updating process posed by ♢φ. Veltman says that ♢φ tells us to per-
form a test on σ as to whether there is a possibility in σ that φ is true,
rather than to incorporate some new information into σ. If σ [φ]≠∅,
that is, σ contains at least one φ-world, σ passes the test, and otherwise
(σ [φ] =∅, which means that it is not possible that φ), contradiction oc-
curs. This form of update is designed to account for the deviance of
the following example, which is of the form σ [φ∧♢¬φ]:3
(6) #Ame-ga futteiru. Daga futtei-nai-kamoshirenai.
rain-Nom falling. but falling-Neg-might.
‘It is raining. But it might not be raining.’
The first sentence updates the speaker’s information state σ, resulting
in σ containing only φ-worlds. Thus the resulting state cannot pass the
test posed by the second sentence, since σ [it is not raining] =∅.
A necessity modal is treated as in traditional modal logic: it is the
dual of a possibility modal, i.e., □φ ↔ ¬♢¬φ (von Fintel and Gillies
(2007) point out the validity of this treatment). Let us see how the com-
putation proceeds:
(7) σ [□φ] = σ [¬♢¬φ]
= σ - σ [♢¬φ]
= σ - σ if σ [¬φ] ≠∅
σ -∅ if σ [¬φ] = ∅
= ∅ if σ - σ [φ] ≠∅
 σ if σ - σ [φ] =∅
Like ♢φ, □φ poses a test on σ in order to check whether all the worlds
contained in σ are φ-worlds; contradiction occurs if σ [¬φ] ≠∅, that is,
there is at least one ¬φ-world in σ, and otherwise σ is retained.
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2.2. McCready’s (2015) Multiple Information States
Addressing the proper treatment of evidentials, McCready (2015)
adopts a dynamic framework that involves multiple information
states. The reason he introduces such a complication rests on the na-
ture of evidentials. Evidentials are linguistic expressions that indicate
that the speaker’s utterance is based on a certain type of evidence or
information source. Indirect evidentials refer to certain indirect evi-
dence, and reportative evidentials signal that the utterance is based on
a report from someone else. What matters is that the difference in
types of evidence allows utterance of the form Indirect (φ) ∧ Reporta-
tive (¬φ), as in (8):
(8) Jimen-no-jootai-o-miru-ni Ame-ga futta-yoo-da ga
ground-Gen-state-Acc-see-from rain-Nom fall-yoo-Cop but
Taro-ga-iu-niwa fur-anak-atta-soo-da.
Taro-Nom-say-from fall-Neg-Past-soo-Cop.
‘Judging from the state of the ground, it seems that it rained, but I
hear from Taro that it didn’t.’
In a case like (8), if the two conjuncts share the same form of update
and target the same information state, the result state will be contra-
dictory. To avoid this, the two conjuncts have to target distinct states.
McCready therefore assumes that one’s information state σ can be di-
vided into several substates, as in the following:
(9) σ = {σInd, σRep, …} or
σ = {σi: i ∈ Source}, where Source is the set of evidence types.4
Thus, Indirect (φ) targets σInf and Reportative (φ) targets σRep. The gen-
eral formulation of targeting substates is represented in (10).
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(10) a. Eiφ represents the proposition with i-type evidence.
b. σ [Eiφ] = σ’ where, for all σj ∈ σ, σ’j = σj [φ] if i = j.
σ’j = σj if i≠j.
(10) says that what is affected by the update with a proposition with i-
type evidence is only a substate indexed with i. Note that each sub-
states contains the same worlds: if σi = {w1, w2} and σj = {w1, w2}, the
worlds sharing the same numeral index are identical, although they
are housed in distinct substates.
McCready further assumes that an evidentially marked proposi-
tion manipulates the plausibility of possible worlds, rather than elimi-
nates some of them. Concretely, Eiφ targets σi and makes φ-worlds in it
more plausible than ¬φ-worlds. The precise formulation is as follows.
(11) a. A substate σ consists of a set of possible worlds S and the or-
deringa over S.
b. For two worlds s and t, sa t iff agent a considers t to be as
plausible as t.
As is clear from (11 a), a substate is a partially ordered set of possible
worlds. A proposition with i-type evidence updates σi in the following
fashion (henceforth, an element with a prime like S’ stands for the up-
dated version of that element):
(12) a. σ [φ] ⇐ = σ’ where S’ = S and s’a t iff either (i) s∈〚φ〛and t∈
s (a)∩〚φ〛or (ii) sa t .
b. s (a) is the set of worlds comparable to s in terms ofa.
Putting (10) and (12) together, informally, once a substate is updated by
φ, no worlds are eliminated, but instead φ-worlds are made more plau-
sible than ¬φ-worlds.
Let us see one simple example. Suppose that the speaker says
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with an indirect evidential that it is raining. Then, in σInd, raining
worlds are ranked higher than non-raining worlds. After that, if the
speaker utters with a reportative evidential that it is not raining, it tar-
gets σRep and orders non-raining worlds higher than raining-worlds. In
this fashion, pieces of information about the plausibility of worlds are
stored in distinct substates, without contradicting each other.
These pieces of information stored in distinct substates and not
interacting with one another cannot be employed in order to compute
the speaker’s whole knowledge (or belief) without further operations.
In the example of the last paragraph, we do not know which worlds
the speaker considers to be more plausible, raining or non-raining
worlds; we have to know the global plausibility ordering that is gener-
ated by taking into account orderings in each substate. To do this,
McCready introduces a merge operation called lexicographic merge.
Although its precise definition is too complicated to introduce here, let
us see informally what it does. Given that there are two substates a
and b, and the information source associated with a is more reliable
than that associated with b, represented as a > b, then the lexico-
graphic merge gives rise to a new ordering where the ordering in a is
retained and privileged over the ordering in b. If the worlds are
ranked equally in a while b orders one of them higher, the latter order-
ing is reflected.5
Consider an example. Suppose there are two substates σInd and
σRep, both containing three worlds, and the plausibility orderings in
them are as in (13 a). If indirect information source is more reliable for
the speaker than the reportative one, the ordering in σInd has a privi-
leged status and is retained, ignoring the parts of the ordering in σRep
that contradict their counterparts in σOInd. Thus, the ordering between
w1 and w2 in σ takes over that of σInd. However, since σInd is indifferent to
the ordering between w2 and w3, the ordering in σRep plays a role. The
result of merging the two substates will be (13 b). By applying this
merging operation to each pair of substates, we can compute the
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global plausibility ordering of an agent.
(13) a. σInd σRep
w1 a w2 ＝a w3 w1 a w2 a w3
b. σ
w1 a w2 a w3
To summarize, in McCready’s (2015) system, the contribution of
an evidential-marked proposition is directed to a certain substate, but
affects the global state σ by applying the lexicographic merge to sub-
states. That is, what a proposition with an evidential does to the global
state is to affect its plausibility ordering, without eliminating any
worlds in it. In this sense, evidential-marked propositions are ‘weaker’
than ordinary assertions, which eliminates worlds incompatible with
them. This weakness is necessary because at least Japanese allows
Evid (φ)∧♢¬φ:
(14) Ame-ga futteiru-[yoo/soo]-da. Ga futtei-nai-kamoshirenai.
rain-Nom falling-[yoo/soo]-Cop. But falling-Neg-might
‘[It seems/I hear] that it is raining. But it might not be raining.’
If Evid (φ) eliminates ¬φ-worlds from the global state, the following ♢
¬φmakes the discourse contradictory.
2.3. Integrating the Two Frameworks: Informal Discussion
McCready’s (2015) dynamic system is dedicated to the treatment
of evidentials and does not go well with the standard framework re-
viewed in Section 2.1., which accommodates negation and modals. The
aim of this section is to modify McCready’s system to fit with the stan-
dard model.
First, and most importantly, in the framework of McCready
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σ I n d
σR e p
σ
(2015), one’s information state is not a set of possible worlds. Rather, as
is seen in (8), it is a set of sets of worlds. Since update operations em-
ployed in the standard model, such as (4) and (5), are designed for an in-
formation state as a set of worlds, they are inapplicable to McCready’s
system. To solve this dilemma, I assume that the global information
state σ, as well as the substates, is a set of worlds and that σ and sub-
states are distinct elements, while McCready defines the former as
containing the latter as its elements. Propositions without evidentials
affect the global information state directly, while those with eviden-
tials contribute to substates. Figures 1 and 2 are schematic images of
Figure 1: The model in McCready (2015)
Figure 2: The current model
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McCready’s system and my own.
This modification allows update with an evidential and that of the
standard style to coexist. This move accompanies the assumption that
for a participant of the conversation, the discourse stores a global in-
formation state and substates separately. I further assume that sub-
states are accessible from the global state σG; when an evidentially
marked proposition tries to update σG, it does not update it but rather
accesses the relevant substate.
The second point of departure from McCready (2015) is that I
adopt the eliminative update for substates as well as for the global
state. Eiφ updates σi and eliminates ¬φ-worlds in it in the same way as
φ updates σG. There are technical and empirical motivations for this
somewhat radical modification. As for the technical one, the definition
of σ [φ] ⇐ , which Eiφ triggers, is at work only when the updater φ is a
proposition (a set of worlds), as is seen in the definition in (12), repeated
as (15) here (in order to make my point clear, I add an underline):
(15) a. σi [φ] ⇐ = σ’ where S’ = S and s’a t iff either (i) s∈〚φ〛and t∈
s (a)∩〚φ〛or (ii) sa t .
b. s (a) is the set of worlds comparable to s in terms ofa.
Given that ♢φ is not a set of worlds in the standard model of Update
Semantics, we cannot compute the update posed by Ei♢φ with (14), al-
though such a configuration is in fact observed in Japanese, as in (3 b).
The empirical advantage of allowing Eiφ to perform the elimina-
tive update is that if it did not exclude any words from σi, Eiφ would be
consistent with a following Ei♢¬φ, which is contrary to fact:
(16) # Ame-ga futteiru-soo-da.
rain-Nom falling-soo-Cop．
Ga futtei-nai-kamoshirenai-soo-da.
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But falling-Neg-might-soo-Cop.
‘I hear that it is raining. But I hear that it might not be raining.’
What (16) teaches us is that Eiφ∧Ei♢¬φ sounds contradictory as is
the case with φ∧♢¬φ. We can capture the oddness of (15) straight-
forwardly by adopting the assumption that whether a proposition pos-
sesses an evidential or not, it updates its relevant state in the elimina-
tive way.
Here a question arises: How can we compute the global plausibil-
ity ordering? In McCready’s (2015) system, evidentially marked propo-
sitions update their own relevant state but eliminate no world in them,
just manipulating the plausibility ordering between worlds. The plausi-
bility ordering in the global state σG is computed by applying the lexi-
cographic merge to pairs of orderings in substates. The lexicographic
merge is, by definition, operative only if a pair of orderings (i.e. sub-
states) contains the same number of worlds; in the case where order-
ings in σi and σj are ‘w1a w2 =a w3’ and ‘w1a w2’, respectively, and i is
more reliable than j, the lexicographic merge cannot generate the or-
dering between w2 and w3 since one of the pair has lost w3. My frame-
work predicts this would happen because an evidentially marked
proposition eliminates worlds in substates.
What is needed is a mechanism that deals with substates that
have different numbers of worlds. First, let us consider how the plausi-
bility of a world in a substate is recast in the current framework.
When Eiφ updates σi, ¬φ-worlds are excluded from σi, which means
that in σi, there is no possibility that ¬φ is true. In terms of plausibility,
φ-worlds are more plausible than ¬φ-worlds. Thus, the eliminative up-
date made by Eiφ in my system has an effect similar to the non-
eliminative one in McCready’s (although the former is stronger than
the latter in that the former excludes any possibility of ¬φ). This al-
lows the following reasoning: a world wn in σ is more plausible than wm





Substates Merge Operation The Global State
w1 w2 w3
w1 w2
w1 =a w2 ≥a w3
Figure 3: Calculation of the global plausibility ordering
ing wm, represented schematically as follows:
The result of this operation reflects the plausibility relation in sub-
states. Note that while the lexicographic merge in the system of
McCready (2015) is applied to a pair of substates, the current merging
operation targets each pair of worlds in the global information state.
This is not the whole story. The merging operation developed so
far cannot deal with the case where the same number of substates
contain two distinct worlds subject to it. For example, suppose σi = {w1,
w2}, σj = {w1, w3}, and σk = {w1, w2}, σl = {w3}. In this case, w1 will be the
highest-ranked world (since for both w1, w2 and w1, w3, the number of
substates that contain w1 is greater than the number containing any
other world), but what about the ranking between w2 and w3? This
situation is like the one we saw in McCready’s system, where two or-
derings contradict each other, like w2 a w3 in σi and w2 a w3 in σj.
McCready proposes that in such cases the reliability of an evidence
source is at work, that is, if i is more reliable than j, i’s ordering is
privileged. I instead adopt this idea: If we are confronted with cases
like the example just above, check what the most reliable source is for
the two sets of substates that contradict each other, and give priority
to the set of substates that have the more reliable source. In the cur-
rent case, as for the ordering between w2 and w3 σi and σk, which con-
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tain w2, are incompatible with σj and σl. Suppose the reliability ranking
between these sources is k < l < j < i. Then the most reliable source
on the side of w2 is i, while that on the side of w3 is j, and therefore the
former will have privileged status, resulting in w2 > w3.
Let us now take a stock. I modified McCready’s (2015) system to
allow the global information state to be a set of possible worlds and
evidentially marked propositions to perform the eliminative update.
This move makes it necessary to develop another merging operation
different from that in McCready’s system. The next subsection formu-
lates the ideas discussed so far.
2.4. Formulation
The knowledge (or belief) of an agent contains her global informa-
tion state σG and substates σInd, σRep…, which are accessible from σG, and
they are sets of possible worlds with indices. The worlds sharing the
same index are identical, but they are contained in distinct states:
(17) For any i ∈ {G, Ind, Inf …}, σi = {wj: j ∈ Index}.
Regardless of whether an evidential is present, a simple proposition
and those with negation or modals update information states in a cer-
tain manner:
(18) For any i ∈ {G, Ind, Rep, Dir…},
a. σi [φ] = σi∩〚φ〛.
b. σi [¬φ] = σi - σi [φ]
c. σi [♢φ] = σi if σ’i [φ] ≠∅.
∅ if σ’i [φ] = ∅.
Evidentially marked propositions which try to update σG access their
relevant substates, and update them in the common fashion (Si is the
set of worlds contained in σi):
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(19) a. σG [Eiφ] = σ’G, where S’G = SG ∧ σ’i = σi [φ], where i ∈ Type.
b. Type = {Ind, Rep, Dir,…}
The merging operation, which is applied to a pair of worlds in σG, can
be defined as follows.
(20) a. wm <a wn in σG if
|{wm: wm∈σi for i∈Type}|< |{wn: wn∈σi for i∈Type}|,
or Best ({i: i∈Type ∧ wm∈σi ∧ wn∈／σi})
< Best({i: i∈Type ∧ wn∈σi ∧ wm∈／σi})
b. Best(P) is the reliability of the most reliable element in P.
So far, it has been unclear when the merge operation is applied to
each pair of worlds in σG. I assume that it operates as soon as an evi-
dentially marked proposition updates σG. In other words, update by an
evidentially marked proposition accompanies the merging operation. I
redefine (19) as (21).
(21) σG [Eiφ] = σ’G, where S’G = SG∧σ’i = σi [φ]∧for all wm, wn∈σ’G,
if { wm: wm∈σ’i for i∈Type}|< |{wn: wn∈σ’i for i∈Type}|
or Best ({i:i∈Type∧wm∈σ’i∧wn∈/ σ’i})<Best ({i:i∈Type∧wn∈σ’i
∧wm∈/ σ’i},
then wm<a wn.
Let me illustrate how σG and substates will be when updated by
an evidentially marked proposition. Suppose that〚φ〛= {w1, w3}, there
are four substate σi, σj, σk, and σl, the reliability ranking is l < k < j < i,
and σG and substates are as in Figure 4 before the update. If σG is up-
dated by Eiφ, Figure 5 results, where a ¬φ-world w2 is excluded from
σi, and therefore the number of substates containing w2 is the same as
contain w3. Since the most reliable source among substates containing
w2 but not w3 is j, while on the side of w3, it is i, w3 wins the competition
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Figure 5: After update by Eiφ
Figure 4: Before update
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and is ranked higher than w2.
3. Illustration
Let us return to the main concern of this paper: why Japanese evi-
dentials asymmetrically take wide scope over negation and epistemic
modals. For the sake of space, all the examples below are yoo-
sentences, but the account I will give is valid no matter which eviden-
tial is employed. First, consider the case of negation:
(22) a. Ame-ga futtei-nai-yoo-da.
rain-Nom falling-Neg-yoo-Cop.
‘It seems that it is raining.’
b.#Ame-ga futteiru-yoo-de-nai.
rain-Nom falling-yoo-Cop-Neg.
‘(Intended) It does not seem that it is falling.’
We start with the acceptable case, (22 a). The utterance in (22 a) is rep-
resented as EInd¬φ, which updates σG in the following way.
(23) σG [EInd¬φ] = σ’G, where S’G = SG∧σ’Ind = σInd [¬φ]∧for all wm, wn∈
σ’G,
if {wm: wm∈σ’i for i∈Type}|< |{wn: wn∈σ’i for i∈Type}|
or Best ({i:i∈Type∧wm∈σ’i∧wn∈/ σ’i})<Best ({i:i∈Type∧wn∈σ’i
∧wm∈/ σ’i},
then wm <a wn.
(σInd [¬φ] = σInd - σInd [φ])
This excludes φ-worlds from σInd, and alter the plausibility ordering in
σG, as desired. Nothing is wrong with this updating process, predicting
the acceptability of (22 a).
Let us not turn to (22 b). Its utterance is represented as ¬Eiφ (I
will omit the description of the computation of the global plausibility
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ordering since below it has nothing to do with the contrast in (21)).
(24) a. σG [¬EIndφ] = σG - σG [EIndφ]
= σG - σ’G, where S’G = SG∧σ’Ind = σInd [φ]∧for all…
= ∅.
As a result of this update, the global information state will always be
the empty set, which means contradiction and the failure of the dis-
course. What causes the contradiction is that the update by an eviden-
tially marked proposition does not eliminate any worlds in σG; all it
does is alter the plausibility ordering. Therefore, subtracting σG [Eiφ]
from σG necessarily results in the empty set, regardless of what kind of
evidence is referred to and what φ denotes. This straightforwardly ac-
counts for the deviance in (22 b).
Next, let us see how the contrast between (3 a) and (3 b) is cap-
tured. Those examples involve epistemic modals. The case of possibil-
ity modals is presented below:
(25) a. Ame-ga futteiru-kamoshirenai-yoo-da.
rain-Nom falling-might-yoo-Cop.
‘It seems that it might be raining.’
b.#Ame-ga futteiru-yoo-dearu-kamoshirenai.
rain-Nom falling-yoo-Cop.-might
‘(Intended) It might seem that it is raining.’
The update in (25 a) will be of the form σG [Ei♢φ]. The computation
proceeds as follows:
(26) σG [EInd♢φ] = σ’G, where S’G = SG∧σ’Ind = σInd [♢φ]∧for all…
= σ’G, where S’G = SG∧σ’Ind = σInd∧for all…, if σInd [φ]≠∅.
∅, where S’G = SG∧σ’Ind = ∅∧for all…, if σInd [φ] ≠∅.
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The result of computation in (26) says that the indirect substate will be
left untouched if it is compatible with φ and otherwise it will be empty,
hence contradiction. In other words, Ei♢φ performs the test on σi,
checking whether σi is compatible with φ, as ♢φ does on σG. This is
what we wanted, considering that it also explains why Eiφ∧Ei¬φ
makes contradiction, as in (16).
Below is the update process by the utterance of (25 b), that is, ♢
Eiφ:
(27) σG [♢EIndφ] = σG if σG [EIndφ]≠∅.
∅if σG [EIndφ] = ∅.
= σG if σ’G, where S’G = SG∧σ’Ind = σInd [φ]∧for all…≠∅.
∅if σ’G, where S’G = SG∧σ’Ind = σInd [φ]∧for all… =∅.
= σG.
As is clear from the result of the computation, the update does not in-
fluence σG at all. This is because an evidentially marked proposition
eliminates no worlds from σG, and therefore σG [Eiφ] will never be
empty, regardless of the content of φ. That is, although the contribu-
tion of a possibility modal is to examine whether the current state is
compatible with the uttered proposition, ♢Eiφ cannot play that role; it
will let any state pass through the test. Put differently, the utterance
of the form ♢Eiφ makes no contribution to the discourse, and it is
quite plausible that meaningless utterances are regarded as deviant,
hence the unacceptability of (25 b).
The same account can be applied to the case of necessity modals:
(28) a. Ame-ga futteiru-nichigainai-yoo-da.
rain-Nom falling-must-yoo-Cop.
‘It seems that it must be raining.’
b.#Ame-ga futteiru-yoo-dearu-nichigainai
rain-Nom falling-yoo-Cop.-must
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‘(Intended) It must seem that it is raining.’
Before turning to (28 b), let us make sure that (28 a) involves a coher-
ent update process (the reader is referred to (7) for computation of the
□-operator).
(29) σG [EInd□φ] = σ’G, where S’G = SG∧σ’Ind = σInd [□φ]∧for all…
= σ’G, where S’G = SG∧σ’Ind = ∅∧for all…, if σInd - σInd [φ] ≠∅.
σ’G, where S’G = SG∧σ’Ind = σInd∧for all…, if σInd - σInd [φ] =∅.
The result will be contradictory if σInd - σInd [φ]≠∅, i.e., σInd contains at
least one ¬φ-world, and otherwise σInd will pass the test. Let us move
on to (28 b):
(30) σG [□EIndφ] = ∅if σG - σG [EIndφ]≠∅.
σG if σG - σG [EIndφ] = ∅.
= ∅if σG - σ’G, where S’G = SG∧σ’Ind = σInd [φ]∧for all…≠ ∅.
σG if σG - σ’G, where S’G = SG∧σ’Ind = σInd [φ]∧for all… = ∅.
= σG.
Since σG [EIndφ] does not lead to eliminating worlds in σG, σG - σG [EIndφ]
will always be empty independent of the denotation of φ; the test
posed by □Eiφ does not play its role as a test as in the case of possibil-
ity modals.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, I integrated McCready’s (2015) innovative dynamic
system into the basic one. What I did is two-fold. First, I posited the
global information state as a set of possible worlds in which the worlds
are ranked according to their plausibility, which is computed with the
help of a merging operation different from McCready’s. Second, I al-
lowed evidentially marked propositions to perform the eliminative up-
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date, in order for the system to deal with evidentially marked proposi-
tions accompanying epistemic modals. This modification is supported
by empirical data. Thanks to these two modifications, we were able to
account for the asymmetric scopal relation between evidentials and
negation/epistemic modals, while maintaining the advantage of
McCready’s system. What enables this account is that evidentially
marked propositions do not eliminate worlds in the global state.
According to Aikhenvald (2004), the scopal behavior this paper is
concerned with is observed in other languages that have grammatical
evidentials. Given that McCready’s (2015) system is applicable to any
language, the framework proposed in this paper, which is a modified
version of McCready’s, can account for the scopal characteristics that
evidentials generally show.
Notes
1 Although I term yoo an indirect evidential, following Davis and Hara (2014),
some researchers such as McCready and Ogata (2007), call it an inferential
evidential. In this paper I do not commit to a position is the debate on how
yoo is categorized, and nothing in the following discussion hinges on this ter-
minology.
2 Other researchers, such as Groenendijk et al. (1996), adopt the same definition
of these operators. For a more detailed introduction to these operators, see
Portner (2009).
3 Here and henceforth, I assume the following definition of conjunction:
(i) σ [φ∧ψ] = σ [φ] [ψ]
4 Since Japanese does not have direct evidentials, which encodes the presence
of direct evidence for the uttered proposition, I do not present σDir as an ex-
ample of substates. However for languages that possess direct evidentials,
such as Cuzco Quechua (Faller (2002)) and Tibetan (Garrett (2001)), we have
to posit a substate indexed with Dir.
5 The reader is referred to Chapter 3 of McCready (2015) for how to compute
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the reliability of an information source.
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